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COST-SHARING AND STUDENT SUPPORT 
 
Introduction
1
 
 
Central to any higher education (HE) system is how it is funded and who pays for HE. Perhaps of all 
aspects of HE this has become the most politicised, emotive, and contested. Across the globe, changes 
or proposed reforms in funding have led to the downfall of governments and mass student protests. 
The story of HE funding, how it has evolved and changed over time, is dominated by the prevailing 
political and ideological currents of a country and the moment, rather than by purely economic and 
pragmatic considerations. Funding policies are shaped largely by the ideological persuasions of 
politicians and legislators, the particular histories and cultures of a country. They involve choices 
about tuition fees and the levels, targets, and forms of financial aid. These choices tend to be less the 
result of rational cost/benefit analyses and more the result of negotiation among stakeholders with 
competing interests who hold varying levels of influence and power. However, policy debates about 
funding are underpinned by the thinking of economists. The language and key concepts used in these 
debates and in government documents advocating change, rely primarily on those of economists.  In 
turn, these debates raise far broader questions about HE such as: the roles and responsibilities of 
individuals and the state in relation to HE, the purpose of HE, who are deemed the key beneficiaries 
of HE, equity, and whether HE is a private or public good.   
 
In recent years many countries are moving from a financing system where the costs of funding HE are 
shouldered primarily by taxpayers, through government subsidy of higher education institutions 
(HEIs), to one where students pay a larger share of the costs. This cost-sharing approach, the focus of 
this chapter, is one of the most significant developments in HE funding. It seeks to alter the balance of 
public and private funding to HE.  This policy shift helps explain the global spread of both tuition fees 
and student loans – the two most prominent forms of cost-sharing. In some countries, such changes 
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occurred gradually, with small, incremental modifications to government policy and market forces. In 
others, the policy shifts have forced more rapid change, necessitating HEIs to make major adjustments 
as their sources of revenue shift. Students too, and in some countries their families, have also had to 
make adjustments as they have been asked to bear a greater burden of the cost of financing their 
university sector (Heller and Callender, 2013). 
 
This chapter addresses the following key questions: What is cost-sharing in HE, and why and how has 
it become part of the HE policy landscape? What are the key cost-sharing policies? Have cost-sharing 
policies met their purported objectives and led to greater financial sustainability, equity, efficiency, 
and responsiveness of HE systems? It attempts to address these questions from a global perspective 
rather than relying on evidence from one particular country. It focuses exclusively on funding issues 
related directly to students so excludes any consideration of for instance, the public and private 
funding of research. 
 
What is cost-sharing in HE, and why and how has it become part of the HE policy landscape? 
 
One way of financing HE is by sharing its costs. There are two sets of costs directly related to 
students: tuition and their living costs while studying.  Johnstone and Marcucci (2010), key advocates 
of cost-sharing, assert that these costs can be viewed as being borne primarily by four parties: the 
government/state/taxpayers; students/graduates; students’ families; and individual or institutional 
donors, or philanthropists.  The policy challenges are deciding how these costs, and which costs, are 
divided between these four groups, and the appropriate balance of financial contributions from each 
group including the share of private and public contributions. Next are choices about the policy 
instruments employed to distribute the costs, and their intended and unintended consequences.  
Essentially, these are ideological and political issues, as well as economic and pragmatic ones.  
 
The sharing of higher education costs has a long history.  Public and private funds have comingled 
since the establishment of Oxford and Cambridge in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The crown 
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and the state predominantly supported both universities. By the thirteenth century financial help for 
poor students was well developed in England and elsewhere in Europe. Students received support 
from the crown, the church, local benefactors, their colleges and families. Not all Oxbridge students 
paid fees and some had their fees remitted in return for undertaking college chores. Similarly Harvard 
College founded in 1636, like Oxford and Cambridge before it, depended on English philanthropy and 
a mix of private and public funding. Harvard continued to receive subsidies from the Massachusetts 
legislature until the 1820s (Wilkinson, 2005).   
 
During the post-World War Two period and until the 1973 economic crisis, as HE expanded, public 
expenditure on HE rose throughout Europe, Australasia, Canada, and in many other developed 
economies. These systems and the costs of instruction were predominately funded from the public 
purse with limited contributions from students or their families. The exception was the US, but even 
here the federal and especially state governments played a major role in the funding of public 
universities  and community colleges which absorb the vast majority of US degree-credit students, 
and in the provision of financial aid to students in both the private and public university sectors.  In 
the US, states’ HE spending continued rising until the 2008 recession (Klein, 2015). However, in 
many of these countries, students’ living expenses were borne by students and their families (Britain 
was an exception).  
 
The policy shift of cost-sharing whereby a greater share of the costs of tuition, and to a lesser extent 
student maintenance,  are transferred onto the shoulders of students and their families and away from 
government and taxpayers, emerges in the 1980s. The shift is directly associated with profound 
changes in political attitudes towards public expenditure. The post-World War II consensus 
concerning the role of the state in the funding of public services, including HE, accompanied by high 
taxation policies to pay for these services, began to break down. This was partly based on the macro-
economic view that the fiscal and monetary policies needed to sustain high public expenditure have a 
damaging effect on national income, and partly on the micro-economic belief that direct subsidies of 
HEIs is a disincentive for improvements in efficiency (Williams, 1992). In the UK, such thinking is 
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marked by the election of the Thatcher Conservative government which heralded the end of the post-
war ‘welfare capitalist consensus’ (Chitty, 2009, p.31) and ushered in a revised version of classical 
market liberalism of the nineteenth century with its idealised notion of the market. Similarly, Ronald 
Regan’s election in the US portended the end of highly progressive income and estate taxes and the 
dilution of other policies aimed at reducing social inequalities. The shift was further strengthened by 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and state socialism in Eastern Europe. 
 
With these developments come significant ideological changes in how HE is viewed and in attitudes 
towards the funding of HE among supranational institutions and governments across the globe 
(Altbach, 1999). There is a move away from the consensus that HE is primarily a public good 
benefiting society as a whole for instance, through the economic growth and greater labour market 
flexibility derived from graduates’ skills and the higher taxes they pay, and other positive social 
externalities such as greater social cohesion, political stability, and crime and poverty reduction. In 
other words, an individual’s efforts to educate themselves, also benefits those around them. This 
emphasis on the social benefits and positive externalities justifies substantial government intervention. 
Consequently, society should, and did, bear most of the costs of HE.  
 
However, encouraged, in part, by the World Bank (1986, 1994) HE instead becomes characterised 
primarily as a private good benefiting the individual more than society.
2
 This reflected the Bank’s 
economic and ideological stance - its ‘celebration of human capital theory’ and its promotion of the 
privatisation of education and user charges in the public sector, especially in developing countries 
(Ball, 2008 p.32). Human capital theory views expenditure on education as an investment which earns 
a positive return for students in the form of greater earnings than would have been possible otherwise, 
once costs are deducted. Graduates, when compared to those without a university degree, tend to have 
increased productivity and higher lifetime earnings, less exposure to unemployment plus greater 
prestige, status and socio-political influence. The high private rates of return to HE provide the 
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economic evidence and rationale for charging more of the cost of HE to the beneficiaries, and are a 
justification for cost-sharing policies. With this new emphasis also comes economists’ belief that 
there is a case on both efficiency and equity grounds for households to meet a significant part of the 
costs. In terms of equity, non-graduates (non-beneficiaries) who come from poorer backgrounds and 
do not reap the high financial returns of HE contribute towards what are already an advantaged group. 
So it was argued that more HE costs should be shouldered by those now seen as the main 
beneficiaries of HE – students and their families. ‘Who benefits pays’ became the mantra 
underpinning cost-sharing policies. 
 
What is the optimum balance of public and private contributions to HE to match these public and 
private benefits? McMahon (2009) argues that the costs of HE should be shared, irrespective of who 
benefits the most. He suggests that the greatest efficiency comes when public investment makes up 
around half of the total funding. But, there is no agreement on what is the ‘right’ balance – ultimately 
it is a political decision.  Others question the validity of using graduates’ earnings to calculate private 
returns because these earnings reflect a graduate’s previous schooling, social background, and 
networks as much as HE outcomes. So these rates of return, are not in fact measuring the returns to 
HE, casting doubt upon human capital theory underpinning them (Marginson, 2013). Even so, if HE 
signals higher ability to employers this strengthens the case for graduates making a larger contribution 
to its costs, along with the fact that graduates do earn more. 
 
The World Bank’s promotion of the private rates of return of HE at the expense of the public returns 
is indicative of its economic and ideological influence in setting the HE policy agenda. This policy 
emphasis, which peppered official government reports on funding, illustrates economists’ role in 
shaping the language of funding policies and the thinking informing them.  It valorises the private 
benefits of HE at the expense of its public and social benefits without questioning the private subsidy 
of public benefits. Moreover, despite underestimating the return of education to society, the 
arguments in favour of cost-sharing as well as the popularization of human capital theory and the 
concept of education as an investment have not diminished.  
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The rise of cost-sharing policies since the 1980s also can be explained by other factors (Johnstone and 
Marcucci, 2010).  First, the expansion of HE, reflecting the rising social demand for HE and its 
growing importance in globalised knowledge-based economies.  The Gross Tertiary Enrolment Ratio
3
 
between 1980 and 2013 increased from 12.2% to 34% worldwide, from 35% to 74% in developed 
countries, and from 5% to 27% in developing countries (UNESCO, 2016). As Trow (1973 p. 1) 
argues ‘In every advanced society the problems of HE are problems associated with growth.’  The 
problems of HE funding relate to increases in ‘the absolute size of systems and individual institutions. 
And….changes in the proportion of the relevant age grade enrolled in institutions of HE’ (Trow 1973 
p 2).  Exploring the relationship between expansion, equality, and quality, Trow poses the dilemma of 
how an expanding HE system can maintain its quality and be affordable. ‘No society, no matter how 
rich, can afford a system of HE for 20 or 30 percent of the age grade at the cost levels of the elite HE 
that it formally provided for 5 percent of the population’ (Trow, 1973, p 36). He suggests that either 
unit costs have to be levelled down, potentially at the expense of quality and standards, or expansion 
restricted at the expense of equity. Others see greater cost-sharing as a potential solution to these 
dilemmas - a means of increasing HE’s resources (McMahon, 2009; Johnstone and Marcucci, 2010).   
 
A second factor explaining the ascendancy of cost-sharing policies is the rising costs of HE and per-
student costs driven by its expansion, the growth of postgraduate education, and the unmet, and ever 
increasing, demand for HE (Heller, 2011). But even without expansion or escalating demand, the 
costs of teaching and per-student costs are significant and constantly rising above inflation due to the 
labour-intensive and ‘productivity-immune’ (Johnstone and Marcucci, 2010 p15) nature of HE.  HE is 
a service industry, and its ‘product’ relies heavily on human interaction, demands a fixed amount of 
time with the consumer/student (reducing it would diminish quality), and is run by highly educated 
individuals commanding high reservation wages. These dynamics lead to rising wages and costs 
without any increase in outputs or productivity. Nor has the introduction of technology led to 
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increased productivity and lower costs, unlike in other sectors. Rather, it has had the opposite effect 
‘technological change and innovation itself are major forces behind rising HE costs’ (Archibald and 
Feldman, 2011, p16). In addition, competition within the HE sector has increased its costs, contrary to 
microeconomic theory. Competition within HE is driven by reputation and perceptions of quality not 
by price - allowing universities to raise their prices. Universities, especially elite ones, to maintain 
their position in a global HE market, spend to enhance that position.  To look better than their 
competitors, they end up in an arms race of spending to improve facilities, academic staff, students, 
research, and technology. This is fuelled by international rankings, particularly in elite universities 
where student demand outstrips supply - providing universities with little incentive to increase their 
efficiency, reduce costs, and get better substitution (Ehrenberg, 2002). But overall, increasing HE 
costs reflect the nature of the HE industry and the economic environment within which it operates 
rather than dysfunctional decision making and inefficiencies within the sector (Archibald and 
Feldman, 2011).  
 
A third factor contributing to the rise of cost-sharing policies is faltering and falling government 
revenues and the inability, or unwillingness, of governments to meet HE’s increasing costs through 
public funds for economic, political and/or ideological reasons. How this is manifested differs 
considerably by country, but it leads to financial austerity which has implications for the financial 
sustainability of HE and the sector’s ability to provide high quality courses and equitable access. As 
Trow (1973) and others (Zumeta et al, 2012) note, as national HE systems grow, they become ‘an 
increasingly substantial competitor for public expenditures’ (Trow, 1973 p4) and the bigger the HE 
system the more critical its relationship to the state, especially in Europe where HE is primarily state 
funded. This funding competition is ongoing, but when combined with macroeconomic factors, which 
lead to constraints on overall government revenues, particularly during periods of slow economic 
growth, the competition becomes more acute. It can be seen clearly throughout Europe and North 
America following the 2008 recession, which led to both falls in tax revenues and considerable 
cutbacks in public expenditure. Spending on HE competes with, and can be crowded out by, for 
instance, spending on compulsory education, health, welfare services, and national security.  
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Ultimately, political factors, which manifest in demands for funding of other services, restrict the 
funding available for HE.  Politicians and policymakers decide how to spend government resources, 
reflecting their ideological leanings as well as financial considerations.  Reducing HE public 
expenditure is just one choice. However, in zero-sum funding environments, HE is particularly at risk 
for three main reasons. First, expenditure on HE is often discretionary rather than mandatory unlike 
other public services. Second, HE ‘has a very small, predefined constituency relative to other 
spending areas’ (Delaney and Doyle 2007, p 56). Consequently, it is potentially a less politically 
contentious policy arena for cutbacks compared to say compulsory education. Thirdly, HE compared 
with other policy areas presents opportunities for cost-sharing. It can draw on other non-government 
sources of revenue, primarily tuition fees but also philanthropic giving. Tuition fees or user chargers 
can be levied without undermining the level of service provided (although they might impact on 
access) unlike other services. These then are some of the components in the political calculus behind 
augmenting or substituting public revenues with tuition fee income.  
 
The final dynamic that helps explain the rise of cost-sharing is the failure of cost-side solutions alone 
to solve the problems of ‘diverging trajectories of costs and available public revenues’ (Johnstone and 
Marcucci, 2010 p. 44).  Examples of cost-side solutions include: reductions in the academic 
workforce, their working hours, and wages; substituting expensive staff with cheaper junior or 
casualised, part-time staff; increasing teaching loads; raising staff: student ratios; expenditure cuts on 
libraries, equipment and other facilities; and deferring costly buildings maintenance.  The list is 
endless. More radical solutions include greater sector differentiation, mergers, and new forms of 
provision such as online degrees. In the long term, such cost-cutting measures may not lead to greater 
efficiencies, are likely to have negative impacts on the quality of provision, and to change the nature 
of the HEIs rendering them less attractive to staff and students. Most significantly, the gap between 
the ever increasing costs of HE and available revenues is just too wide to close by expenditure cuts. 
Hence the need for additional, non-government sources of income to supplement insufficient, and 
often declining, government funds. 
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What are the key cost-sharing policies? 
 
The main purpose of cost-sharing policies is to increase the total resources available to HE and 
specifically, from non-governmental or private sources (McMahon, 2009; Johnstone and Marcucci, 
2010). They aim to shift a greater share of the costs of both instruction and student maintenance from 
government and taxpayers to students and their families.  Both these costs can be shared in various 
ways. Countries differ dramatically in how they apportioned them between the 
government/state/taxpayers; students/graduates; students’ families; and philanthropists, despite many 
countries having very similar HE goals. And, there are a variety of ways in which these costs can be 
met.  In the case of tuition, public subsidies can be paid directly to HE institutions benefiting all 
students equally, or through tuition fees, or a combination of both. Tuition fees can be paid directly by 
students’ families or students can borrow money and repay pay it out of their post-graduation income, 
or a mix of both. Students’ living costs can also be paid directly by students’ families, by government 
grants, through student loans repaid later, or an amalgamation of all three. So cost-sharing can mean 
various combinations of ways of meeting these two types of costs. 
 
Cost-sharing can be invoked and configured in numerous ways. The key policy tools for reducing the 
government’s share of HE costs include changes to: 
 
1. Tuition fees and administrative charges: their introduction/reintroduction or large 
increases. Administrative fees can include registration fees, examination fees or 
obligatory contributions to student unions. 
2. User fees: their introduction or increases, to recover the expenses of institutionally or 
government provided, and formerly free or subsidised, student services such as 
housing, catering, and transport (e.g. in the 1990s in Russia and most of Eastern and 
Central Europe).  
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3. Direct grants, bursaries, scholarships and social security benefits to students for 
tuition and/or maintenance: their abolition, reduction or freezing (e.g. Russia and 
many Eastern and Central European countries in 1990s), and/or the narrowing of the 
eligibility criteria for this aid. 
4. Student loans: their introduction to cover tuition fees and their increasing role in 
replacing student grants, especially for maintenance.  
5. Government subsidies on student loans through changing cost recovery strategies: 
their abolition or reduction. These subsidies vary depending on the design of student 
loans systems. They can be achieved, for instance, by introducing or increasing 
student loan interest rates and the period of time interest is charged, lowering the 
income threshold when income contingent loan repayments start, and abolishing debt 
forgiveness or increasing the period time before debt forgiveness takes effect (e.g. 
Australia 2007, England 2012). 
6. Tax benefits and family allowances to cover education costs aimed at students’ 
parents: their abolition, reduction or freezing their value. These tax benefits (e.g. 
Austria, Canada and US) and family allowances (e.g. Czech Republic, France, 
Germany and in about half of all European countries) tend to be available in those 
countries where students are considered financial dependants on their parents. 
7. Block grants to HEIs: reduced or abolished. 
8. Private HE: the development or expansion of unsubsidised or partially subsidised 
tuition dependent private sector in HE systems which historically have been 
dominated by a subsidised public sector (e.g. Brazil, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, the 
Philippines, and other Latin American countries). 
 
The first six policy tools can be applied to all HE students and their families, or to just some of them – 
practices differ between and within countries. All student financial aid policies, whether for tuition or 
maintenance involve choices. They implicitly or explicitly have to address the following three 
questions: who should get the most support? (e.g. needy, virtuous, or able students); why help them? 
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(e.g. to give the disadvantaged a break, to ease the burdens of the middle classes, to encourage effort 
or reward talent, to maintain recruitment and encourage retention); and who should provide the 
financial support?  (philanthropists, universities from their general income and other students tuition 
fees’, the government via public funds, graduates though the loans they repay after university) 
(Wilkinson, 2005). The eligibility criteria for student support, therefore, are numerous and can include 
for instance: students’ academic attainment; family household income; type of institution attended; 
qualification aim and level of study; mode and subject of study; and country of origin.  
 
The rise of tuition fees 
 
Tuition fees and administrative charges to cover instruction costs are by far the most common form of 
cost-sharing globally, and the focus of policy debates and ideological struggles. This private 
contribution to HE is justified by the high private rates of returns. Tuition fees supporters consider 
them the most attractive cost-sharing policy because fees can provide HE with an ‘efficient and 
robust’ income stream ‘that is potentially sizeable, [and] continuous’ (Johnstone and Marcucci, 2010 
p44).  Moreover, tuition fees can be introduced ‘without simultaneously adding new costs or diverting 
faculty from their core teaching responsibilities which is generally not the case with supplementing 
revenues via grants and contracts or other forms of faculty entrepreneurship’ (Johnstone and 
Marcucci, 2010, p 67). Higher tuition fees, argues the OECD (2015 p 264) ‘increase the resources 
available to educational institutions, support their efforts to maintain quality academic programmes 
and develop new ones, and can help institutions accommodate increases in student enrolment.’ Some 
proponents of tuition fees also argue that because students have to pay them, students make better and 
more responsible enrolment decisions and are more likely to complete their studies. 
 
Opponents of tuitions fees stress the considerable public benefits and positive externalities to HE 
which justify high public subsidies (Vossensteyn, 2005). They argue that these require financial 
support, for instance, to sustain the highly educated workforce needed for growth and prosperity in 
globalised knowledge economies. Others suggest that the higher taxes graduates pay represents a user 
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contribution which is part of a collective public investment and so fees are unnecessary (NUS, 2014). 
Those against fees emphasise too the social mission of universities and their contribution to the 
amelioration of social inequality. Specifically, that tuition fees may impede access to HE. 
International research has repeatedly demonstrated that ‘students from more disadvantaged 
backgrounds are more sensitive to net price changes’ (Santiago et al, 2008 p 182) than those from 
wealthier backgrounds.  This equity argument is frequently used in those countries with low or no 
tuition. It also is the main reason for the provision of student financial support to defray these and 
other HE costs. Adversaries also claim that quality and well-considered enrolment decisions can be 
encouraged in other ways, such as through well-developed quality assurance systems. Finally, they 
raise concerns that tuition fees, especially when introduced within the context of the marketization of 
HE, potentially turn HE into a consumer good – undermining the very essence of HE, students’ 
learning experiences, and the co-production of knowledge (Barnett, 2013). 
 
Tuition fees within the public HE sector can be found across the world’s continents (Marcucci, 2013).  
They have a long history in the private HE sector and in the public sector in countries like the US. But 
many countries, especially in Europe, abandoned tuition fees following World War II. However, since 
the late 1980s tuition fees have become more widespread. They were introduced or reintroduced for 
instance in Australia in 1989, New Zealand 1990, Hungary 1994, England 1998, China 1998, and 
Austria 2001. Between 1995 and 2010, 14 out of 25 OECD countries increased their tuition fees, and 
10 countries reformed them between 2010 and 2013/14 (OECD, 2015).  
 
As discussed, various forces have encouraged the rise of tuition fees. Yet, it is hard to identify the 
factors which explain their presence or absence, and the level of fees charged, within a particular 
country.  Broadly, they are linked to a country’s history, politics and ideology. More specifically, they 
tend to be associated with prevailing beliefs about the appropriate size of government, the proper 
extent of transfer payments, the acceptable level of direct and indirect taxes, and the role of markets 
versus government regulation and steering. For instance, the US, England, Australia, and some 
Canadian provinces, have relatively high public university tuition fees and tend to: embrace the 
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privatisation of public services generally; have more faith in markets; and endorse smaller 
governments and lower taxation. Japan and South Korea have similar characteristics but high levels of 
taxation. At the other end of the political/ideological spectrum, Nordic countries, with their strong 
welfare economies and acceptance of high levels of taxation, charge no tuition fees and provide help 
with students’ living costs.  Their approach reflects deeply rooted social values, such as social equity, 
the salient cultural value of free education, and the principle that access to tertiary education is a right, 
rather than a privilege. Most of the rest of Europe has low or no tuition fees
4
 (except the Netherlands,  
Ireland, Switzerland) and large governments, but provide students with limited help with their 
maintenance costs (Eurydice, 2015). So among these European countries, there is still an element of 
cost-sharing, which is long-standing, because rarely do their HE funding systems cover all students’ 
educational and living costs. 
The average amount of tuition fees charged, ranging from $0 to $9,000
5
 in England for a bachelor’s 
degree or equivalent in 2013/14 (OECD, 2015, Table B5.1a and Chart B5.2), not only varies between 
countries but also within countries depending on: level of education; field of study; students’ socio-
economic background; students’ academic attainment; mode of study; and domicile. Consequently, 
the proportion of students paying fees and how much they pay also varies across and within countries. 
Some of these tuition fee differences (e.g. field of study) are justified by the different educational 
costs associated with providing certain programmes of study and the higher rates of private returns 
associated with them (e.g. Australia). In other countries, free education is enshrined in the law, but to 
meet the increasing demand without raising public expenditure, dual track systems have developed. 
For example, in Russia the most academically able students attending prestigious public universities 
pay no fees while those with lower prior academic attainment pay full-cost fees mostly at private 
universities or in the fee-paying tracks in public institutions. In essence, such dual track fees act as 
government-sponsored merit based scholarships, favouring the most advantaged.  
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5
 In 2012/13 tuition fees in England for new entrants rose from over $4,000 to over $12,500 but only students in 
their first year of study paid these higher fees, bring the average to $9,000. In future years this average will rise 
considerably. 
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Student financial support and the rise of student loans 
 
Integral to the cost-sharing policy agenda is the increasing use of student loans both for tuition and 
maintenance.   As suggested, one of the key arguments against tuition fees is their potential deterrent 
effect on HE participation. If countries put the burden for tuition and maintenance costs entirely on 
the shoulders of families, they risk attracting the wealthiest students but not the brightest, which 
means not making the most out of their country’s talent, perpetuating inequalities, and impeding 
social mobility. International research has repeatedly demonstrated that raising fees without 
increasing loans and/or grants by the same value, or more, depresses participation, especially among 
those for lower socio-economic groups (Dearden et al, 2010). Thus a robust system of student 
financial support is important for student outcomes and HE access. Also critical is the type of 
financial assistance - loans and/or grants - and the mix of that aid. 
 
The central objective of government sponsored student loan schemes around the world differ 
(Ziderman, 2013). Where cost-sharing is the main purpose, loans generate more income for the 
university sector by facilitating tuition fee increases and making fee hikes more politically and 
socially acceptable.  
 
‘The disincentive effects [on participation] of up-front tuition fee increases may be offset also 
by the availability of loans for students that will cover these augmented costs. Loans enable 
student borrowers to avoid up-front payments for HE (whether for tuition fees or living 
expenses) by delaying payment, which will be rendered in manageable instalments out of 
enhanced earnings after graduation’ (Ziderman, 2013 p 34).   
 
So loans, like tuition fees, are predicated on the high private returns of HE.  They shift more of the 
costs of HE on to graduates. Loans have to be repaid by students and so are a private cost, unlike non-
repayable grants (for tuition and/or living costs) which are a direct subsidy to students and funded 
100% by government. Loans, supporters argue, even if subsidised by government  are cheaper than 
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grants and can help reduce public expenditure on HE. They potentially free up more government 
funds for student financial support so that more students can benefit from such aid, helping to increase 
overall access to HE.  
 
Opponents of loans suggest that they are less effective than grants in encouraging access to HE among 
low-income students. They also highlight how loans may be less efficient than anticipated because of 
the type of loan and the costs of administering, financing, and servicing loans. As Ziderman (2013 p 
43), a loans supporter, argues 
 
Since a grant offers a stronger and more direct incentive for access than does a (partially) 
repayable loan, the apparent advantage of loans over grants is less clear-cut. This highlights a 
central conundrum in loan policy: at what level of built-in loan subsidy does a grant become a 
more cost-effective instrument for helping the poor than a subsidized loan (with hidden 
grants)? 
 
The incentives and risks of investing in HE for both students and governments vary. Adversaries of 
loans point to research suggesting that some potential students, particularly those from low socio-
economic groups, are debt averse and deterred from entering HE by the prospect of student loan debt 
(Callender and Jackson, 2005). Thus, loans potentially perpetuate socio-economic inequalities in 
access to HE. Such arguments are often dismissed by economists who argue that debt aversion is 
irrational given the high financial returns of HE, thus ignoring a social reality. 
 
In theory, the risks students face can be mitigated by the student loans available, although we have 
limited empirical evidence to prove this definitively. Basically there are two types of student loan 
repayment arrangements with collections being determined in a set time period - ‘mortgage-type’ 
loans (e.g. US, Thailand and Canada), or by the graduate’s income - ‘income contingent loans’ - the 
less a graduate earns, the less she repays (e.g. England, Australia, New Zealand, Hungary).  These 
repayment arrangements have implications for the loan ‘repayment burden’ - the proportion of a 
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graduate’s income per period needed to repay their loan.  The higher the repayment burden, the lower 
the graduate’s disposable income which can cause financial hardship and affect graduates’ physical 
and emotional well-being (Gallup, Inc. 2014; Dwyer et al, 2011). In addition, greater repayment 
burdens increase the likelihood that graduates will not repay their loans because of low pay. For 
instance, in the US student loan defaulters are much more likely to have low incomes (Dynarski, 
1994; Gross, et al, 2009). By contrast, income contingent loans are specifically designed to avoid high 
repayment burdens with the proportion of a graduate’s income required to service their student loan 
debt capped by legislation (Chapman and Lounkaew, 2010). Even so, levels of debt on graduation can 
still be high even with income contingent loans, which has adverse effects on governments if large 
numbers of students are unable to repay their loans because of low-earnings (OECD, 2014, Box 5.1).  
 
Across OECD countries, most have introduced their loan systems since the late 1980s. Just as 
different countries’ approach to tuition fees varies considerably, so does their use and the penetration 
of student loans for tuition, maintenance, or both. Also loan eligibility criteria, the type of loans 
available, and the terms and conditions attached to them such as loan repayments, interest rates 
charged, and debt forgiveness, differ enormously (OECD, 2015 Table B5.4). Again it is difficult to 
explain these variations. Loans are well developed in countries with high tuition fees (e.g. Australia, 
England, US) and have high take-up rates but they are also well established in Nordic countries that 
charge no tuition fees and are used to cover students’ living costs. Loans in countries like England and 
the US are also available for both the costs of tuition and maintenance. Across the OECD in 2013/14, 
the value of loans ranged from $1,458 per annum in Belgium to over $10,000 in Norway and over 
$16,000 ($5,612 maintenance and $10,824 tuition) in England while the average among 20 countries 
exceeded $4,000 (OECD, 2015, Table B5.4). Generally, the larger the proportion of students with 
loans, the higher the average value of their loans.  
 
As suggested, the increasing reliance on loans is in part, associated with the rise to tuition fees, but as 
also discussed, loans and tuition fees do not always go hand in hand. Another recent development has 
been the substitution of loans for grants in meeting students’ living costs as a means of reducing 
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government expenditure.  For instance, loans are replacing existing grants in countries like Canada, 
the Netherlands, England, and in the US since the late 1970s. Again, more of the costs of HE are 
being placed directly on the shoulders of students. 
 
Have cost-sharing policies met their purported objectives?  
 
The ascendency of cost-sharing policies and the theoretical rationale underpinning them, as we have 
seen, is primarily informed by market orientated neo-liberal economics. In line with this thinking, in 
theory, cost-sharing should lead to greater financial sustainability, equity, efficiency, and 
responsiveness of HE systems (Greenaway and Haynes, 2003).  It is beyond the scope of this chapter 
to assess the achievement of these purported benefits in any detail but it can point to some general 
trends and highlight the nature of the empirical questions that need to be addressed for a more 
thorough assessment.  
 
Financial sustainability 
 
The key aim of cost-sharing is to increase HE’s total resources and its income from private sources so 
it no longer has to compete with other public services and demands on government spending. This 
reduced dependence on shrinking public resources is considered central to financial sustainability.  
 
In theory, cost-sharing and tuition fees, should make the HE better-off overall while the costs of HE 
to government should fall or remain stable. In turn, this raises the following empirical questions. 
 
• Has cost-sharing led to a change in the share of HE’s income from private and public sources 
and does a greater share now come from private sources? 
• Have HEI’s total income improved or remained the same as a result of cost-sharing?   
• Has public expenditure on HE fallen and private expenditure risen? 
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There is plenty of evidence of decreases in governments’ share of funding to HE relative to funding 
from private sources as well as real falls in government funding overall and government per student 
funding across Europe and the US (Geiger and Heller, 2010). For example, among 20 OECD 
countries, the average share of public funding for tertiary institutions decreased from 
68.8% in 2000 to 64.5% in 2012 primarily because of changes in tuition fees.  Conversely, between 
2000 and 2012, the proportion of private funding for tertiary education increased in 17 out of 22 
OECD countries. The average private share was 30% in 2012, but ranged from less than 5% in Nordic 
countries to 70.7% in Korea, largely reflecting the level of tuition fees charged (OECD, 2015, Table 
B3.2b).   
 
Between 2000 and 2012, private expenditure on educational institutions tended to rise faster than 
public expenditure. However, public investment in tertiary education also increased in most countries 
over this period, regardless of the changes in private spending, and so these HE systems were better 
off financially.  In some countries, tuition fees just offset the loss in revenues from the falls in public 
funding, and so did not increase the sector’s overall revenues. In Portugal and England the prime goal 
of tuition fee reforms were to bring about a net shift in the cost-sharing balance.  The 2012 changes in 
England, particularly demonstrate a clear shift towards the private funding of HE – with liquidity and 
affordability constraints assuaged through loans, underpinned by government funding. So HE public 
funding has been almost entirely replaced by private financing through fees and loans.  However, the 
public costs of financing these loans are very high, adding to national debt and the public contribution 
(McGettigan, 2015). This raises the broader question of whether government-funded loans are 
classified as public or private funding. Practices vary in different countries, adding to the complexity 
of interpreting comparative OECD data.  
 
Equity 
 
The equity assertion is aligned to cost-sharing’s mantra of ‘who benefits pays’.  To recap, students 
reap a range of private individual benefits from their HE qualification while those without such a 
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qualification do not despite the fact that they, and all taxpayers, contribute towards the costs of 
government-subsidised HE. Importantly, the main beneficiaries of HE, those mostly likely to 
participate, are people from middle and higher income backgrounds. Thus a tax is imposed on low-
income individuals to privilege an already privileged group. In essence, public subsidies are being 
used to redistribute wealth from people who are less well-off to those who are better-off. This is 
considered unfair and inequitable (Glennester et al, 1995).  
 
Government subsidies to HEIs and grants to students do result in most of the money benefitting 
students from already relatively privileged families.  However, as suggested, this discourse ignores 
the public benefits and social positive externalities of HE, despite the fact that these may outweigh the 
costs of a mainly publically funded system of HE due to the tax revenues and social contributions 
accrued from graduates (OECD, 2015, Chart A7.3). For instance, research on the financial returns to 
HE in England shows that ‘the private benefit of a degree, in terms of lifetime earnings net of tax and 
loan repayments, is large - in the order of £168k (£252k) for men (women) on average. The social 
benefit to the government is also large (of the order of £264k (£318k) from men (women) graduates – 
far in excess of likely exchequer cost. (Walker and Zhu, 2013, p 5 italics added). 
 
These high private financial returns to HE assumed in the equity argument need further scrutiny. On 
the one hand, Walker and Zhu’s (2013) calculations reaffirm cost-sharing thinking and the high 
returns.  On the other hand, they and others also provide evidence potentially undermining this 
premise, and point to rising inequality. Specifically, research highlights the substantial variation in 
graduate earnings, across and within nations, which have increased over time, paralleled with rising 
'over-education' (Green and Zhu, 2010). There is mixed evidence on the extent to which the ‘graduate 
premium’ is holding up as HE expands, more graduates enter the labour market, and markets in 
graduate labour change.  Studies measuring the private returns produce large variations in estimates, 
and contradictory trends with both growth and falls (Walker & Zhu 2013; Jenkins et al. 2012; Gregg 
et al. 2014). Significantly, those least likely to reap high financial benefits and to gain ‘graduate jobs’, 
tend to come from lower socio-economic backgrounds and to have attended the least prestigious 
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universities (Boliver, 2011).  These are also the graduates most likely to leave HE with the largest 
student loan debt, especially in countries with high tuition fees. For such graduates, the returns may 
be low - there may be no link between the cost of their degree and its later value in the labour market. 
Consequently, the extent of ensuing social mobility arising from HE – an implicit assumption within 
the cost-sharing debate -  is unclear. Some studies suggest high levels that have not deteriorated over 
time (Gorard 2008; Goldthorpe 2012, Saunders 2012; OECD, 2015 Chart 4.1) others low levels 
(Blanden 2011; Jantti et al 2006).  
 
Another issue concerning the equity of provision and tuition fees is whether fee levels are set 
nationally or whether each university is able to set its own fee. This effects the extent of the variation 
in tuition fee charged by different HEIs within a country, and how high fees may inhibit or deter 
access to the most expensive and prestigious universities due to liquidity or affordability constraints. 
 
The equity argument also poses other empirical questions including: 
  
• Has cost-sharing had an impact on HE participation rates? 
• Has the composition of the student body changed? 
• Have students changed their behaviour to limit their HE costs? 
 
Some argue that cost-sharing far from creating greater equality actual leads to inequality because 
tuition fees are a barrier to HE access, especially for poorer students. This is because tuition fees 
reduce the real, or perceived, rate of return for HE whereby individuals no longer want to invest in HE 
or because individuals face liquidity-constraints and fees are unaffordable. These constraints are 
likely to have varying effects on different student groups. For example, US research suggests that 
students from lower socio-economic groups strongly react to the gross (sticker) price of tuition fees 
and not the net price after student support.  Hence, tuition increases – even with commensurate 
increases in financial aid – will discourage them.  Consequently, even if the overall demand stays 
constant, there may still be an effect on the overall composition of the student body.  
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The general consensus in the research is that aggregate demand for HE amongst ‘traditional’ age 
students is relatively insensitive to increases in price at an aggregate level (Dynarski, 1994). For 
instance, Orr et al’s, (2014) study of seven countries from the European Union and two from outside 
Europe (Austria, Canada, England, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Portugal and South Korea) 
explored the relationship between tuition fees rises and their effects on aggregate demand and 
enrolment between 1995 and 2010. They conclude that among the case study countries, participation 
rates continued to rise regardless of fees policies and only exceptionally large fee increases had any 
negative impact on participation. Similarly, the OECD argues that there is ‘no strong cross-country 
relationship between levels of fees and participation in tertiary education. However, among countries 
with high tuition fees, student financial support systems that offer loans with income-contingent 
repayment combined with means-tested grants may help to promote access and equity while sharing 
the costs of HE between the state and students’ (OECD, 2015, p 263).  
 
Yet, with all such studies, the full effects of tuition fee increases are unknown because we do not 
know what would have happened to enrolments in the absence of reforms. Indeed, establishing 
causality is a major methodological challenge when examining the impact of tuition fees and student 
support on HE participation.   
 
Why is it that HE participation rates continue growing despite high and rapidly rising private costs?  
One reason maybe that young people’s other options are becoming more limited and less desirable. 
Indeed, it was for this reason that Trow (1973) classified HE participation rates of 50% and over as 
universal. The penalties attached to non-participation are too high. If young people do not enter 
tertiary education, the threat of poverty is much greater. ‘As income inequalities escalate, the cost of 
failing to secure a place in the top half of society rises, and so the perceived benefits of a university 
education rise in turn. If future UK society [and many others] is to have a few more princes and many 
more paupers, then the risk of taking on student debt may be less than the risk of not going to 
university’ (Dorling, 2014).  
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The impact of cost-sharing on the total number of people participating in HE is just one part of the 
access story. As important is who enters, and whether the composition of the student body has 
changed over time.  Comparable international data charting changes over time are unavailable. Orr et 
al’s (2014) limited data and analysis suggest that fee reforms have no effect on the gender 
composition of the student body and little to no effect on the proportion of students drawn from lower 
socio-economic or minority ethnic backgrounds (Orr et al, 2014, p.12). However, as evidenced in 
England, after the 2012 tuition fees hike, there have been falls in demand among older students and 
those studying part-time (Callender, 2013).  Moreover, as discussed, fee increases without equivalent 
increases in student aid tend to cause declines in participation, especially among poorer students. The 
deterrent impact of tuition fees on enrolment is about twice as strong as the attractive power of grants 
(Vossensteyn, 2005), while grants have a stronger influence on participation than loans (Ziderman, 
2013).  Thus, any changes in tuition fee levels must be examined alongside student financial support 
in order to understand the impact of cost-sharing policies on both participation and study behaviour. 
 
Students may change their behaviour to limit their HE costs and debt by taking particular decisions 
about how, what and where to study (Callender, 2006). For instance, they may switch from full-time 
to part-time study, choose cheaper or shorter courses or subjects of study with higher financial 
returns, decide to live at home rather than away, or engage in more paid term-time employment. Most 
such choices potentially have negative consequences or limit opportunities, creating further 
inequalities amongst the study body.  There is some evidence of such changed behaviour in various 
countries, especially the US. For instance,  increases in tuition fees have gradually driven low-income 
and ethnic minority students away from four year university programs and instead towards less 
prestigious two-year colleges (Duffy & Goldberg, 1998; Kinzie et al., 2004; McPherson et al., 1993). 
However, both the limited amount of research on the impact of cost-sharing on students’ decisions 
plus an absence of comparable international data make firm conclusions difficult to draw. 
 
 
  
24 
Efficiency and responsiveness 
 
The final assumption informing cost-sharing is that it leads to greater producer responsiveness which 
drives greater efficiency. As private funding increases, the HE sector is motivated to maximise its 
private revenue which in turn increases its responsiveness to student demand and its efficiency. This 
is in contrast to direct public subsidies which are considered a disincentive for improvements in 
efficiency.  Again, these ideas are underpinned by economic thinking - the notion that tuition fees 
represent the price of a valuable commodity in high demand and so bring to HE some of the virtues of 
the market. Together, they make consumers more discerning while universities seek their place in the 
HE market.  Markets, through competition and user choice, are assumed to improve quality. 
Theoretically, competition drives up teaching quality while driving down prices through efficiency 
gains. This of course begs the question as to whether HE is, or can ever operate purely as a market or 
quasi-market. It points to some of the negative consequences arising from attempts to create a HE 
market (Brown, 2013). 
 
This raises the following empirical questions: 
 
• Are HEIs maximising their revenue from private sources? 
• Is HE provision becoming more diverse, in response to student demand? 
• Has the quality of the student experience improved? 
 
There is limited research on the impact of increasing shares of private funding on HE’s 
responsiveness and a lack of readily comparable international data and indicators to assess its effects.  
To adequately address these questions demands detailed data on for instance; whether HEIs are 
focusing on programmes that are popular or cheaper to deliver; whether the number of institutions, 
programmes have increased while staff: student ratios decreased ; and whether HEIs are spending 
more on students. 
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Such assumptions may be overly simplistic. Institutional responsiveness to user demand is conditional 
on the attractiveness of these private revenues and whether increasing them has trade-off effects for 
the overall behaviour or prestige of HEIs. For instance, maximising private contributions via 
expansion, might as Trow (1974) observed, lead to poorer quality provision, or dilute the elite nature 
of some universities. The likelihood of HEIs increasing their efforts to attract new and more students 
will depend on the incentive structures which surround tuition fees which might favour other 
behaviours such as the maximisation of public over private funding. Moreover, the ability of HEIs to 
diversify their provision by for instance, increasing student numbers, changing programme provision, 
and dictating fee levels depends on high levels of institutional autonomy and a light touch regulatory 
framework.  Universities in many European countries have limited (but growing) autonomy, but their 
funding models are often designed to stimulate user responsiveness. Elsewhere such as in England 
and the US, the policy thrust has been towards a de-regulated HE quasi-market with high levels of 
institutional autonomy but with growing and new forms of performance and accountability measures. 
 
Orr et al’s (2014) overview of these issues in nine, mainly European, countries produces little to 
support these benefits attributed to cost-sharing. They conclude that: HEIs’ behaviour is not 
necessarily affected by the availability of fee income; real responsiveness does not result from putting 
private funding into public university systems but comes from permitting new institutions both public 
and private to evolve; and the resources gained through new fee-derived income are not always 
invested in ways that would be expected to perceptibly improve the student experience. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has argued that cost-sharing policies are now an entrenched feature of the global HE 
funding landscape, fuelling expansion. They seek to alter the balance of public and private 
contributions to HE so that more of HE’s costs are borne by students. But cost-sharing is not simply a 
transfer of the costs of higher education to private consumers.  There is more to cost sharing than a 
shift to fees, possibly underwritten by loans. And this is clear when we consider the two distinctive 
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types of HE costs – tuition and students’ living expenses. These costs are often treated very 
differently and cost-sharing can mean various combinations of ways of meeting the two types of 
costs. The ascendency of sharing the costs of tuition in the 1980s is primarily associated with 
profound political and ideological shifts in attitudes towards public expenditure and the funding of 
HE. Specifically, HE was no longer viewed primarily as a public good benefiting all in society, but 
instead as a private good mostly benefiting the individual. ‘Who benefits pays’, based on popularized 
human capital theory and rates of return, became the new language of HE funding and the mantra 
reinforcing cost-sharing policies. Other more pragmatic forces encouraging cost-sharing’s rise were 
the expansion of HE, its rising costs, and declining government revenues and the failure of costs 
solution to meet these increasing costs. 
 
There are numerous cost-sharing policies but the most prominent and widespread are tuition fees and 
student loans. Economic thinking and concepts have helped inform their development, rationale, and 
design.  However, as this chapter shows, the presence and absence of these policies, their scale and 
scope, level, reach, and form, within and across countries, can be attributed to the prevailing political 
and ideological currents of a country and the moment, and the particular histories and cultures of a 
country. The espoused virtues of cost-sharing policies in promoting financial sustainability, equity, 
and greater efficiency and sector responsiveness are similarly informed by economic reasoning. Yet, 
their overall effectiveness in delivering these is open to question. On the whole, cost-sharing has 
increased the total resource available to HE and prompted a shift in the share of income from public to 
private sources. However, as Johnstone and Marcucci (2010) warn ‘Cost-sharing is no miracle cure’ 
(p.282). They continue ‘…our advocacy of cost-sharing is always an advocacy for its ability to 
supplement and augment government revenues, never to replace it.’ (p. 283).  In these times of 
austerity, there is a very real danger of such substitution. And all these policies may well may be at 
the cost of more widely drawn notions of equity. 
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